Safety – Regulation – Training. The Three keys to SSN Operations

Presentation by Richard Brown, Nuclear Design and Assurance Engineer, KBR Australian Nuclear Association ANA2024 Conference at UTS Aerial Centre, Ultimo, NSW, on Friday 11 October 2024. Abstract The US Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) programme commenced in March 1951 with Project Nautilus, and subsequent commissioning of the USS Nautilus in 1957. The approach to safety, training and regulation, then, as now, remains key to the continued success of the UK and US SSN programmes and the evolving Australian nuclear powered propulsion programme. Significant research across the varied SSN programmes has been undertaken into different areas of safety, regulation and training to further our understanding, improve technologies, processes and training. However, at its core (pun intended), the three keys to successfully operating an SSN remain fundamentally ingrained within Safety, Regulation and Training. Over time, these covenants more than just determine the SSN crew’s attitude, behaviour and performance; they represent the foundation of the trust agreement between the SSN programme and the Public, thus ensuring the credibility and success of the SSN programme. These explicit, specialised domains of Safety, Regulation and Training are so implicitly interconnected within the collaborative nuclear propulsion environment, that it becomes near impossible to comprehend where one ends, and another begins. Research at Bristol University in the UK and Griffith University in Australia considers how the interpretation and understanding of nuclear safety is completed in practice; that is, how we think of and understand what nuclear safety is, and how we apply it. This research draws upon current international nuclear-powered submarine/civil energy programmes as well as drawing upon experiences accrued from the 1951 Project Nautilus conceptual design to illustrate how Safety, Regulation and Training are applied to foster a skilled workforce, ensuring technical integrity, and maintaining robust nuclear safety assurance of the programme. The breadth of history associated with the SSN programme has shaped the behaviours, attitudes, language, and culture within the nuclear propulsion community that remains current today. The development of the Australian nuclear-powered submarine programme can benefit greatly from this extensive UK and US experience, while being adapted to suit Australia's unique needs and circumstances. The question then remains, how can we effectively adopt and embed these established practices and incorporate learning to ensure the success of our own program?