Pasukan RPKAD Kejar Kolonel Sahirman Sampai Tewas

RPKAD Troops Pursue Colonel Sahirman to His Death This is the testimony of Hendro Subroto, a TVRI journalist, while serving with the Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD) in the hunt for Colonel Sahirman. Colonel Sahirman was a key officer in the Diponegoro Military Command (Kodam Diponegoro) at the time, leading the Revolutionary Council in Central Java after the September 30th Movement erupted in Jakarta. However, after the September 30th Movement failed and the Army launched a counter-offensive operation, Colonel Sahirman and his followers fled Semarang. This was especially true after the Diponegoro Military Command headquarters was retaken by troops loyal to the then-Commander of Diponegoro, Brigadier General Suryosumpeno. In mid-October 1965, under the direct leadership of its commander, Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, RPKAD troops were sent to Central Java to assist the Diponegoro Military Command in clearing out the remaining supporters of the G30S/PKI. Hendro Subroto, a TVRI journalist at the time, participated in covering the movements of the Red Berets during the operation to crush the G30S/PKI in Central Java. Hendro Subroto's testimony while covering the movements of the RPKAD troops in Central Java was later included in his book, "PKI Revolutionary Council: Revealing Its Failure to Communist Indonesia." According to Hendro, the G30S/PKI power struggle in Central Java involved several assistants to the VII Diponegoro Military Command (Kodam VII), the Chiefs of Staff of the Regional Military Command (Korem), and the Korem section chiefs. However, after the movement in Central Java failed, they fled to the G30S/PKI retreat area in the Merapi-Merbabu Complex. According to Hendro Subroto, the Diponegoro Military Command (Kodam) officers who supported the G30S/PKI movement who fled included former Colonel Sahirman, Assistant I/Intelligence; former Colonel Marjono, Assistant III for Personnel; former Lieutenant Colonel Usman Sastrodibroto, Assistant VI for Socio-Political Affairs; former Major Suherman, Assistant 5 for Territorial Affairs; former Major Karsidi, Deputy Assistant for Operations; former Major Subadi, Head of Section 3/Personnel of the 073rd Military Command (Korem) in Salatiga; and former Captain B. Supono of the 073rd Military Command (Korem). "However, there were also Kodam-VII/Diponegoro personnel and Air Force (AURI) members involved in the G30S/PKI who retreated to the Merapi-Merbabu Complex," Hendro Subroto wrote in his book. Hendro said that former Major Kartawi, Head of Section 2/Operations of the 072nd Military Command/Pamungkas Yogyakarta, had previously been captured in Magelang. Then, in an effort to pursue former Colonel Sahirman and his gang, Operation Merapi was established on December 1st under the leadership of Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo as Commander. Section 1/Intelligence was headed by Major Taher, Pasi 1/Kodam-VII/Diponegoro, who was seconded to the Army's Special Forces Command (RPKAD), and Section 2/Operations was headed by Major Sutjipto. The operation was led by Major CI Santosa, assisted by Captain Daryono, Kasi 1/RPKAD, who also served as Deputy Commander of the 1st RPKAD Battalion. The RPKAD troops deployed in the operation to pursue former Colonel Sahirman and his gang included Oerip Company, Kayat Company, Tedjo Company, and Sembring Company, assisted by two platoons of Panzer Companies seconded to Lieutenant Kayat. Furthermore, Operation Merapi, Hendro Subroto said, was reinforced by three Soviet-made Mil M-4 helicopters from the Army Aviation (Penerbad) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Widodo, who used Ksatrian Slamet Riyadi, Kandang Menjangan, Kartosuro, as their home base. Hendro Subroto still remembers a meeting where Major CI Santosa, the Commander of Battalion 1 RPKAD, was asked by Colonel Sarwo Edhie how long it would take to capture former Colonel Sahirman and his associates. The RPKAD Major answered firmly, "Two weeks at the most." According to Hendro, after the meeting, he had a conversation with Major CI Santosa and asked why the Commander of Battalion 1 RPKAD was so confident that he could capture former Colonel Sahirman and his gang within two weeks at the most. When asked, Major CI Santosa instead asked, "How long can a person carry a backpack of food on their back? A week? Two weeks?" Hendro remained silent until Major CI Santosa continued. Major Santosa said the eastern slopes of Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu are arid. He has determined that former Colonel Sahirman and his gang cannot survive without the help of the local population. Meanwhile, the population has begun to side with the government.