Andai Saja RPKAD Tak Ada di Cijantung, Mungkin G30S PKI Akan Menang

If Only the Army Commandos Hadn't Been in Cijantung, the G30S/PKI Might Have Won If only the Army Commandos hadn't been in Cijantung, the G30S/PKI might have celebrated its victory. How could that have happened? History records that the Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD), the Indonesian Army's special forces unit, now known as Kopassus, was the backbone of the operation to crush the G30S/PKI. The RPKAD troops, relied upon by the then-Pangkostrad (Kostrad) Major General Soeharto, seized two vital assets: the RRI (Republic of Indonesia Radio) and the telecommunications office from the 30th September Movement (G30S) conspirators. They also relied on the RPKAD to seize control of Halim Perdanakusuma Air Base, and thanks to their role, the Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) well, where the 30th September Movement (G30S/PKI) plotters hid the bodies of the kidnapped generals, was discovered. Apparently, before the G30S/PKI incident, there was an effort by the 30th September Movement's leaders to withdraw all RPKAD troops so that they would not be present in Jakarta when the coup attempt erupted. The leader of the G30S/PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) who attempted to remove the RPKAD from Cijantung was Brigadier General Soepardjo. What happened? Watch the story in this video. After receiving a report from two of General Ahmad Yani's adjutants who arrived in Cijantung early in the morning about the kidnapping of the Minister of the Army Commander, RPKAD Commander Colonel Sarwo Edhie immediately ordered the Commander of Battalion 1 RPKAD Major CI Santosa to recall the RPKAD troops who had already departed for Senayan to participate in a dress rehearsal for the ABRI Day commemoration, scheduled for October 5, 1965. According to Rum Aly in her book, "The Crossroads of Power in 1966, Myths and Dilemmas: Students in the Process of Political Change 1959-1970," the RPKAD troops who departed for Senayan were fully armed but lacked ammunition. Colonel Sarwo Edhie ordered Major Santosa to immediately withdraw his troops back to Cijantung. According to Rum Aly, at that time, the RPKAD personnel in Cijantung were limited, especially since some were in the border area with Malaysia or stationed elsewhere. Santosa immediately headed to Senayan and arrived there promptly at 6:00 a.m. Major Santosa gathered all members of Battalion I and ordered them to board trucks and depart immediately for Cijantung. A Navy Rear Admiral, who was coordinating the troops prepared for the event in Senayan, appeared and asked what was going on and where the troops were going so early in the morning, but Major Santosa politely avoided the question and quickly left. On the way, they encountered a supply truck sent by Sarwo Edhie, loaded with ammunition. Major CI Santosa immediately distributed the ammunition to his troops, so that from that moment on, the troops, consisting of several companies, were ready for battle. At the Cijantung Army Command Headquarters, Battalion 1 assembled in the field, joining a company from Battalion 3 from Central Java. They had arrived some time earlier and were preparing to depart for the border confrontation area in West Kalimantan, but their departure was delayed by several hours due to air transportation issues. There were also several personnel, including instructors from Batujajar, who would be participating in the ABRI Day activities. Major CI Santosa gave a brief briefing, stating that no troop member was to move without his orders, and that "I will shoot those who disobey." Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who spoke afterward, briefly explained that several Army generals had been kidnapped that morning. It was unclear by whose orders, where they were taken, and what their fate was at that time. Sarwo also warned of vigilance, as it was still unclear who was friend and who was foe. According to Rum Aly, the First Battalion of the Indonesian Army's Special Forces (RPKAD) was practically the last remaining personnel in Cijantung, while the others were generally already in the border areas of the Malaysian confrontation. In fact, this battalion was even nearly sent to the Kalimantan border at the request of Brigadier General Soepardjo, Commander of the Second Kalimantan Combat Command. In August 1965, Brigadier General Soepardjo, Commander of the Second Combat Command, sent a radiogram to RPKAD Commander Colonel Sarwo Edhie. This radiogram, sent at the end of August, was somewhat unusual according to established procedures. Its contents were quite questionable, at least for Colonel Sarwo Edhie. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani had recently personally advised that "Cijantung must not be empty."