Principal Agent Models Part 1: Moral Hazard with Observability

In part one, we look at a model with the potential for Moral Hazard (Hidden Actions) that might hurt the Principal), but first assume that you can observe the effort of the agent. In the next video, we will assume that the agent's actions are hidden, but output is not-- solving the true moral hazard problem for the optimal contract. Link to Download Handout: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3-F... Link to Video on Risk Aversion & Uncertainty:    • Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Basics   Link to Video 2: What if Effort is not Observable?    • Principal Agent Models Part 2: Moral Hazar...   Link to my Uncertainty Playlist:    • Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Basics   My Website: http://www.burkeyacademy.com/ Support me on Patreon!   / burkeyacademy   Talk to me on my SubReddit:   / burkeyacademy