Lecture 5: Nash Equilibrium
MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025 Instructor: Ian Ball View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-eco... YouTube Playlist: • MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Th... In this lecture, Ian Ball explains Nash equilibrium, a game theory idea that describes a situation where each person is choosing the best response to everyone else, so no one gains by changing alone. Using examples like two friends choosing between a Celtics game and a Red Sox game and a hide-and-seek game, the lesson also shows why people sometimes need to randomize their choices to avoid being predictable. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA More information at https://ocw.mit.edu/terms More courses at https://ocw.mit.edu Support OCW at http://ow.ly/a1If50zVRlQ We encourage constructive comments and discussion on OCW’s YouTube and other social media channels. Personal attacks, hate speech, trolling, and inappropriate comments are not allowed and may be removed. More details at https://ocw.mit.edu/comments.

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