Die irrationale Strategie der CDU | Prof. Dr. Christian Rieck

The CDU's actions can no longer be interpreted as rational. The coalition strategy has placed the CDU in a grotesquely weak position. By deceiving voters, the SPD has an interest in causing the coalition negotiations to fail and can enforce a maximum demand. You can pre-order the book "Princely Money, Fiat Money, Bitcoin" here: https://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASI... https://www.westarp-bs.de/978-3-92404... By the way: My book "From PowerPoint to Power Point" is now also available as an audiobook. The beta version is currently available at a special price: https://payhip.com/b/SFydm (Thank you for testing it and letting me know if anything needs to be improved). The Federal Constitutional Court has since rejected an urgent motion against the convening of the old Bundestag: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.... Stefan Homburg's tweet, in which he elaborates on a similar idea: https://x.com/SHomburg/status/1898063... (The Mau-Mau phrase came from a response to this). ►FURTHER INFORMATION FROM TEAM RIECK: Amendments to the Basic Law require a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and Bundesrat (Article 79 of the Basic Law), which creates a high hurdle for modifications. The debt brake was incorporated into the Basic Law (Article 109 GG) in 2009 to prevent excessive government debt. It limits new federal borrowing to a maximum of 0.35% of gross domestic product (GDP) per year. Federal states are generally not permitted to incur new debt unless there is a natural disaster or an exceptional emergency. The goal of the debt brake is long-term budgetary discipline and ensuring sustainable public finances. A key instrument for circumventing the debt brake is the so-called "special fund." This term is misleading, as it does not actually represent existing assets, but rather additional debt recorded outside the regular budget. This construction allows new liabilities to be incurred without violating the limits of the debt brake. Examples include the coronavirus aid packages, the €100 billion special fund for the German Armed Forces, and the Climate and Transformation Fund. This practice circumvents the actual intention of the debt brake, which regularly leads to political and constitutional debates. For the CDU and SPD, the debt brake and its circumvention have strategic implications. The CDU has historically positioned itself as a supporter of the debt brake. A departure from this would be perceived as a breach of promise and could damage its credibility on economic policy issues. The SPD, on the other hand, has long advocated for a relaxation of the debt brake to enable greater government investment. Political negotiations often result in long-term policy positions being adjusted in favor of short-term coalition options. In the past, this has led to political reversals on several occasions. Comparable historical cases show that political parties often deviate from their original positions after elections. In 2005, the CDU promised a VAT increase of only 2%, but after the election, jointly with the SPD, increased it by 3%. In the 1990s, the solidarity surcharge was introduced as a temporary measure but remained in place well beyond its original term. Such examples demonstrate that political decisions often do not correspond to the original election promises. From a game-theoretic perspective, the CDU seems to assume that voters will forget a reversal regarding the debt brake within four years. At the same time, however, this strengthens the SPD's negotiating position, as it is aware of the CDU's vulnerability to political blackmail. The coalition negotiations themselves are a debit item that the CDU has not adequately considered. The following book is also relevant: *The Art of Perfect Failure: https://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASI... ►MORE FROM CHRISTIAN RIECK: *Guide to Outsmarting Yourself: https://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASI... *Cheating with ChatGPT: ○https://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASI... ○https://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASI... ○YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/ProfRieck?s... ○Instagram:   / profrieck   ○Twitter:   / profrieck   ○LinkedIn:   / profrieck