I Britannici RISERO delle difese italiane a Cheren — finché gli Alpini resistettero per 54 giorni...

February 3, 1941. British General William Platt confidently predicted his 25,000 troops would sweep through the Italian mountain fortress at Keren, Eritrea, in just "two or three days." His forces had overwhelming superiority: tanks, complete air dominance, heavy artillery, and veteran Indian divisions fresh from victories across Sudan. The Italians seemed doomed - numerically inferior, isolated, and defending what appeared to be just another obstacle on the road to Asmara. But when the first British assault began on February 5th, something extraordinary happened. Italian Alpini mountain troops, Granatieri di Savoia, and Bersaglieri had transformed the granite mountains into an impregnable fortress. They'd mined the Dongolaas Gorge, positioned artillery observers on peaks that saw everything, and prepared defensive positions that made the terrain itself their greatest weapon. Every British assault was met with devastating counterattacks. When the British finally captured positions after horrific losses, Italian troops would immediately counterattack and reclaim them. For 53 bloody days, Italian forces demonstrated that professional soldiers, superior tactics, and perfect terrain knowledge could stop an empire. The battle cost Britain 536 dead and 3,229 wounded - making it the most costly engagement of the entire East African Campaign. Italian troops only surrendered on March 27th when ammunition was completely exhausted. British commanders openly acknowledged Italian bravery, and the defense delayed the British advance by two months, indirectly affecting Rommel's operations in North Africa. Keren proved that Italian soldiers, when well-led and properly positioned, ranked among the finest mountain troops in the world. *SOURCES:* This story is based on comprehensive historical documentation from multiple authoritative military history sources. The Battle of Keren (Italian: Battaglia di Cheren) occurred from February 3 to March 27, 1941, during the East African Campaign of World War II. Primary source documentation comes from British official military histories, including the Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War by historian Bisheshwari Prasad, published in 1964, which provides detailed accounts of the 4th and 5th Indian Infantry Divisions' operations. British General William Platt's operational reports and personal writings document his initial expectations and later acknowledgment of Italian military competence. The Imperial War Museums archives contain contemporary photographs and military reports from the campaign, including Platt's statement before the final assault on March 14, 1941: "Do not let anybody think this is going to be a walk-over. It is not. It is going to be a bloody battle." Casualty figures are confirmed through multiple independent sources: British and Commonwealth forces suffered 536 killed and 3,229 wounded, while Italian forces lost approximately 3,000 Italian soldiers and 9,000 colonial Ascari troops. The battle's 53-day duration is consistently documented across all historical accounts. Italian military records detail the deployment of elite units including the 65th Infantry Division "Granatieri di Savoia," Alpini mountain troops, and Bersaglieri regiments. The defensive preparations, including the destruction of the Ponte Mussolini bridge and the blocking of Dongolaas Gorge with boulders and mines, are documented in both Italian and British after-action reports. Contemporary accounts from British officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bateman's diary entries and Captain James Richardson's field reports, describe the intensity of Italian resistance and the effectiveness of their counterattacks. General Wavell's post-war memoirs acknowledge Keren as the hardest-fought battle in the East African Campaign. The strategic impact is documented in operational histories showing the delay in British access to Massawa port (which fell April 8, 1941) and the subsequent effect on Allied supply lines in the Red Sea. Military historians note the correlation between the Keren delay and the timing of Rommel's arrival in North Africa, though direct causation remains debated. The battle has been analyzed in numerous military studies as a textbook example of effective defensive mountain warfare.