The Passenger Jet That Went Rogue | The Traumatic Flight Of Iceland Air Flight 213

This is the story of 213 on the 26th of february 2013 an iceland air 757 was on its way from Copenhagen to Keflavik. The flight was coming to a close and the pilots were at the top of the descent into keflavik. The pilots were going over the approach that they would be making and the plane had the autopilot engaged. At 9:45 pm right as the plane was about to hit the top of the descent while the plane was at 36000 feet the pilots got a warning. A flight attendant called in something weird, the flight attendant had heard something weird, there was this steady bass sound coming from the floor of the plane and this was anything else that he had heard in his entire career and so he decided to call the flight deck to let them know that this was happening. The first officer scanned his instruments and nothing looked off and he asked the flight attendant if he could ascertain which side of the plane the sound was coming from. The sound was coming from all around him. But still nothing showed up on the instruments, the senior flight attendants also let the pilots know about the sound that was permeating the aft end of the plane. Then as the pilots were taling to ATC about the descent intro keflavik, they felt the floor vibrate, not much but it was there and they got their first actual warning of the flight. Right hydraulic quantity. The right hand hydraulic system was running out of hydraulic fluid. You see hydraulic fluid is the lifeblood of planes.It is what is used to move the control surfaces and drop and retract the landing gear. You lose hydraulics youre screwed, but to be fair there are multiple redundancies. It is hard to lose all of your hydraulics. But it has happened before, right here on this channel a couple of months ago we talked about a DHL 757 that lost its hydraulics and then had to make an emergency landing. I’ll have links for you to watch that video at the end of this one. So this crew was busy consulting the quick reference handbook to see what they should do in the case of a hydraulic system failure. As they worked the checklist they got another warning. Right hydraulic system pressure. The flight crew had a sobering realisation, they had lost the right hydraulic system. But this is not the end of the world the plane would be able to make it down with no issues. But they knew that upon landing they would not have the use of some of the spoilers on the right wing, the right autopilot, the right hand thrust reverser and the right stabilizer trim an the autobreak. Think of it as if the plane had had a stroke. In situations like these runway length would be an issue as the plane would not have all of its braking devices to help slow it down but the long runway at kelfavik would not make that an issue. As the plane descended the flight crew put the plane through its paces to see what she could and couldnt do. The crew noticed that the spoilers were performing badly. With that the plane was vectored to runway 20 and established on the localiser as the plane cut through the fog the pilots were running checks to see make sure that this landing would be as trouble free as possible. As the plane got onto final the pilots extended the flaps and and the landing gear was extended, the plane vibrated as the gear dropped. It vibrated a little too much. The first officer noted that the plane was now starting to bank to the left. The plane was at 2400 feet off of the water and it was making a turn that no one on the flight deck had commanded. The pilots looked down at the EICAS expecting to see a disagree warning, telling them that the control surfaces on one side of the plane disagreed with the other side. But it was clear no such warning. The plane now started to bank to the left quite strongly and they had no idea why. The first officer disconnected the autopilot and then commanded a right turn to keep the plane on track, but nothing the plane did not respond. The captain knew that something was wrong and maybe in a bid to gain altitude he commanded a go around. As the jet went around the left bank kept getting worse eventually the plane was climbing and banking to the left at 34 degrees. As the jet