4/14【核武装論】最強の”専門家”がひろゆきを2秒で完全論破してしまう！皆さまはどう思いますか？#参政党#神谷宗幣#片山さつき#小野田紀美#高市早苗#日本保守党

Channel's Viewpoint ■ "Nuclear Armament is Cheap"—What This Debate Asks Following comments by Sanseito Party member Kiyoka Shioiri regarding the cost-effectiveness of nuclear armament, a full-fledged discussion on nuclear armament unfolded on Abema Prime. While Hiroyuki presented his own views, security expert Akiyama meticulously and accurately summarized the points. Hiroyuki stated, "The question is whether nuclear deterrence completely doesn't exist," and "If one missile is fired and Los Angeles is destroyed, and we don't know where the next two missiles will be fired, then I think ceasefire negotiations are possible," indicating his position that it's difficult to deny nuclear deterrence itself. On the other hand, Akiyama prefaced his remarks by saying, "First, the question is whether Japan wants to become like North Korea," before developing a more precise analysis of the reality of nuclear deterrence. While the debate on nuclear armament is an emotionally charged topic, this discussion highlighted its complexity once again. ■ Is it true that "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the decisive factors in ending the war"? When Hiroyuki stated, "Japan dragged on the war for a while, but after the nuclear bombs were dropped, they realized they couldn't continue," Akiyama pointed out, "There are many negative views on whether Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the decisive factors in ending the war." This is a historically important point. Research is increasingly arguing that multiple factors, such as Soviet entry into the war against Japan, the fear of a mainland invasion, and Emperor Showa's decision, were intricately intertwined. The expert's point, questioning the simplistic premise that "using nuclear weapons will end the war," must be taken seriously. ■ "One shot will bring about a ceasefire"—Akiyama's dismantled premise The core of Hiroyuki's nuclear deterrence theory was the scenario that "one nuclear shot will make the other side agree to negotiations." However, Akiyama refutes this from multiple perspectives. First, regarding operational issues, he pointed out that "nuclear submarines cannot fire unless they surface. Once one missile is fired, another cannot be fired because there is a high probability that the submarine will be sunk." Furthermore, he outlined the basic principle of nuclear operations: "Nuclear weapons are all depleted within 30 minutes. If we do not retaliate before the nuclear weapons reach the target, we will lose our own nuclear assets." His statement, "It's not normal to assume that one missile won't work, but three won't," undermined the very premise of Hiroyuki's argument. ■ "What if China and Japan fired 10 missiles each?"—Realistic figures reveal the reality One of the most striking points presented by Mr. Akiyama was a comparison of the nuclear forces of Japan and China. The statement, "Two missiles in Tokyo, two in Yokohama, two in Osaka, and two in Nagoya, for a total of eight. Is the Tokaido Beltline safe? If I were China, and I said, 'Japan will fire,' they would say, 'Go ahead,'. Do you know how many cities with populations of 10 million or more are there?" uses concrete numbers to illustrate that nuclear deterrence is based on a "balance," and that deterrence ceases to function when that balance is disrupted. The concept of "how much strategic ambiguity can be calculated" was also presented, pointing out that in a disadvantageous position in nuclear forces, it may become impossible to maintain ambiguity that would cause anxiety among the adversaries. This discussion clearly showed that the debate on nuclear armament is not simply a matter of "having them makes you safe," but requires a comprehensive consideration of the balance of power with the adversary, operational strategy, and international political costs. ■ "It's no good just having rough arguments"—The importance of expert knowledge At the end of the discussion, Mr. Akiyama stated, "As Hiroyuki said, discussions shouldn't be based on feelings, but on selecting what is appropriate from the discussions accumulated over the past 80 years. It's no good just having rough arguments." Security and nuclear deterrence are topics that intersect with multiple specialized fields such as nuclear strategy, international law, military technology, and diplomacy. In today's world, where "intuitively plausible arguments" easily spread on social media and discussion programs, this dialogue reaffirms the importance of deepening discussions while respecting the knowledge accumulated by experts. The question of whether or not to pursue nuclear armament is a question that the entire nation must confront, and it is the responsibility of voters to continue learning about the realities of security without being swayed by emotional arguments or cost-benefit analyses. [Sources/References] ① Abema Prime (Hiroyuki & Akiyama)    • 【核のコスト&リスク】過去最大の防衛費8.8兆円台要求へ？核武装の方が安い？超現実的...   ② Abema Prime (Suzuki)    • 【核武装論】コスパ悪くても関係ない？核保有→通常兵器の戦争増加説も？鈴木一人「抑止は...   0:00 Introduction 00:48 Explanation ①...