Iberia Flight 933 Aftermath Footage

Follow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/aircrashdai... Accident Description: https://www.instagram.com/p/CmQ2JMzPg... 𝗜𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗮 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟵𝟯𝟯 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Madrid to Boston, operated by a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (Reg. EC-CBN) on 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟳, 𝟭𝟵𝟳𝟯. The plane departed Madrid at 09:03. At 15:34, Flight 933 contacted Boston Approach Control. The approach vectors to intercept the instrument landing system (ILS) localizer course controller cleared the flight to descend to 3,000 feet and provided radar for runway 33L at Logan International Airport. At 15:38, the approach controller informed the flightcrew that they were 9 miles from the outer marker (OM) and cleared the flight for the ILS approach to runway 33L. Two minutes later, the controller cleared the flight to contact the Boston control tower. Flight 933 contacted the Boston tower local controller who at 15:40:30 advised "... runway... visual range is is out of service, the visibility is three quarters, the wind is three one zero at ten, report the lights in sight." Flight 933 responded, "Roger". At 15:41:44, the local controller cleared Flight 933 to land and informed the flightcrew that the braking action was reported to be fair to poor. At 15:42:22, the radio operator-navigator on Flight 933 reported to the tower: "... runway in sight". At 15:42:31 the plane struck approach lights 500 feet short of the threshold and collided with a dyke. The right main gear was sheared off, the plane then skidded and came to a rest 3,000 feet from the threshold. 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲: "The captain did not recognize, and may have been unable to recognize, an increased rate of descent in time to arrest it before the aircraft struck the approach light piers. The increased rate of descent was induced by an encounter with a low-level wind shear at a critical point in the landing approach where he was transitioning from automatic flight control under instrument flight conditions to manual flight control with visual references. The captain's ability to detect and arrest the increased rate of descent was adversely affected by a lack of information as to the existence of the wind shear and the marginal visual cues available. The minimal DC-10 wheel clearance above the approach lights and the runway threshold afforded by the ILS glide slope made the response time critical and, under the circumstances, produced a situation wherein a pilot's ability to make a safe landing was greatly diminished."