Chief of Army History Conference 2025 - A History of Reviews

In November 2025, the Chief of Army's History Conference was held at Parliament House in Canberra. This year's topic: Mastering the Army Profession. As the Army faces a range of challenges in preparing for an increasingly complex strategic environment, we need to consider how best to position ourselves to ensure that Soldiers at all levels, from the most junior ranks through to senior leadership, proactively embrace mastery of their profession. A History of Reviews Moderator: COL Tom McDermott, Director, Chief of Army's Initiatives Group From Territory to Function: Reorganising the Post-Vietnam Australian Army - Prof John Blaxland, Australian National University Following Australia’s withdrawal from Vietnam, the Army underwent major strategic and organisational change. The Forward Defence era—deployments to Korea, Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam—ended, and under Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, defence management was reoriented. Secretary of Defence Sir Arthur Tange consolidated the Navy, Army, Air, Supply, and Defence departments into a single entity, while the Army itself adapted under the guidance of Professor T.B. Millar and Army Chief Sir Francis Hassett. Post-Vietnam funding cuts, the end of National Service, and a shift toward continental defence prompted the Army to move away from overseas operations. Legacy state-based commands were replaced by functional commands supported by administrative military districts, focusing on training, logistics, and deployable field forces—a structure that endured for over fifty years. Prof Blaxland examines these changes, their causes, and their lasting impact on the contemporary Army. Phantom Menace: Australian Army Doctrine Development, 1972-99 - Prof Michael Evans, Deakin University/Australian War College In August 2000, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade (JSCFADT) described the Army as a “phantom force” disconnected from its strategic environment. This presentation examines how doctrine—from Vietnam to East Timor—contributed to that judgment. From the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, Army doctrine focused narrowly on continental defence, ignoring global shifts after the Cold War. Rigid, insular, and outdated, doctrine treated continental defence as an end point rather than a framework for assessing realistic military challenges. By 1996, the Howard government’s push for maritime-littoral roles and force projection revealed “an Army without a strategy, and a strategy without an Army,” forcing a rapid doctrinal overhaul ahead of East Timor and later operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prof. Evans concludes with lessons from this period, highlighting their relevance as Australia faces late-2020s strategic challenges: declining US dominance, large-scale conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and rising Indo-Pacific great power competition. Original post: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/chie... About The Cove is the Australian Army’s professional development platform. We provide access to professional resources and events and promote discussion within the profession of arms. Visit https://cove.army.gov.au Disclaimer The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government. The Cove is a professional development site for the Australian Profession of Arms. The views expressed within individual blog posts and videos are those of the author, and do not reflect any official position or that of the author's employers' – see more here. Any concerns regarding this blog post, video or resource should be directed in the first instance to [email protected].